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Title: What is the “Paradox of Phase Transitions?”  
Abstract: 
I present a novel approach to the recent scholarly debate that has arisen with respect to the   
philosophical import one should infer from scientific accounts of “Phase Transitions,” by 
appealing to a distinction between “representation” understood as “denotation,” and “faithful 
representation” understood as a type of “guide to ontology.” It is argued that the entire debate of 
phase transitions is misguided for it stems from a pseudo-paradox that does not license the type 
of claims made by scholars, and that what is really interesting about phase transition is the 
manner by which they force us to rethink issues regarding scientific representation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction. 
“Phase Transitions” (PT) include a wide variety of common and not so common phenomena in 
which the qualitative macroscopic properties of a system or a substance change abruptly. Such 
phenomena include, among others, water freezing into ice or boiling into air, iron magnetizing, 
graphite spontaneously converting into diamond and a semi-conductor transitioning into a 
superconductor.  There exists a flourishing scholarly debate with respect to the philosophical 
import one should infer from the scientific accounts of phase transitions, in particular the 
accounts’ appeal to the “thermodynamic limit” (TDL), and regarding how the nature of PT is 
best understood. It has become standard practice to quote the authoritative physicist, Leo P. 
Kadanoff, who is responsible for much of the advances in real-space Renormalization Group and 
in understanding PT, in order to better ground the puzzlement associated with PT: 
The existence of a phase transition requires an infinite system. No phase transitions occur 
in systems with a finite number of degrees of freedom. (Kadanoff 2000, 238) 
If we add to the above that observations of boiling kettles confirm that finite systems do undergo 
PT, we conclude that rather odd paradox arises: PT do and do not occur in finite, and thus 
concrete and physical, systems. The above is taken as a basis for warranting such scholarly 
claims to the effect that PT are irreducible emergent phenomena (e.g. Lebowitz 1999, S346; Liu 
1999, S92; Morrison 2012, 143; Prigogine 1997, 45), which necessitate the development of new 
physical theory (Callender 2001, 550), and inducing a wide array of literature that argues to the 
contrary (e.g. Bangu 2009; Batterman 2005, 2011; Butterfield 2011; Menon and Callender 2011; 
Norton 2011; Wayne 2009). 
 In this paper I would like to build on the works of Mainwood (2006) and Jones (2006) to 
further investigate what exactly is the “paradox” of PT, which is meant to license the type of 
scholarly conclusions and discussions noted above. It seems to me that a natural condition of 
adequacy for the particular claim that PT are emergent phenomena, as well as the more general 
debate that arises, is that there really be a bona fide paradox associated with PT. In other words, 
it really must be the case that a phase transition “is emergent precisely because it is a property of 
finite systems and yet only reducible to micro-properties of infinite systems,” or more recently, 
that “the phenomenon of a phase transition, as described by classic thermodynamics cannot be 
derived unless one assumes that the system under study is infinite” (Lui 1999, S104; Bangu 
2009, 488). Accordingly, in Section 2 I describe the paradox and suggest that much of the debate 
revolving around PT stems from it. In doing so, I appeal to Contessa’s (2007, 52-55) distinction 
between “representation” understood as “denotation,” and “faithful representation” understood as 
a type of “guide to ontology” (Sklar 2003, 427). Afterwards, I will continue to argue for a 
negative and a positive thesis. My negative thesis is that there really is no paradox of phase 
transitions and that in order to get a bona fide paradox, i.e. a contradiction, one must undertake 
substantial philosophical work and ground a type of “Indispensability Argument,” akin to the 
kind appearing within the context of the Philosophy of Mathematics. Since none of the 
proponents of the PT debate undertake such work, and since indispensability arguments are 
highly controversial, I claim that the entirety of the debate, insofar as it is grounded in the 
paradox of PT, is utterly misguided and that the philosophical import that has been extracted 
from the case study of PT with regard to emergence, reduction, explanation, etc., is not 
warranted.  
 
 
However, I also have a positive thesis. In Sub-section 2.1 I show how the paradox can be 
generalized and arises whenever a scientific account appeals to an “Essential Idealization”1 
(EI)—roughly, when a scientific account of some concrete physical phenomena appeals to an 
idealization in which, in principle, one cannot attain a more successful account of said 
phenomena by “de-idealizing” the idealization and producing a more realistic idealization. In 
doing so, I suggest in Section 3 that what is really interesting about phase transitions is the 
manner by which they illustrate the “Essential Idealization Problem,” which is tightly connected 
to issues arising in the context of scientific representation and scientific realism. The upshot is 
that, insofar as proponents of the phase transition debate have been contributing to the EIP, 
certain aspects of the debate have been fruitful. Consequently, I outline various possible 
solutions to the EIP and the paradox of PT, which have been extracted from Butterfield (2011) 
and Norton (2011). I suggest that, although such solutions pave the road for further work to be 
done, it is questionable whether they are conclusive and exhaustive. 
2. What is the “Paradox of Phase Transitions?” 
In his 2001 paper, “Taking Thermodynamic Too Seriously,” Craig Callender presents several 
allegedly true propositions that jointly induce a paradox concerning PT―that concrete systems 
can and cannot undergo PT:2 
1. Concrete systems are composed of finite many particles 𝑁. 
2. Concrete systems display PT. 
3. PT occur when the partition function 𝑍 has a discontinuity. 
4. The partition function 𝑍 of a system with finite many particles 𝑁 can only display a 
discontinuity by appealing to the TDL. 
5. A system in the TDL has infinitely many particles.3 
 
Tenets 1-2 imply that concrete and finite systems display phase transitions while tenets 3-5 imply 
that only infinite systems can undergo a phase transitions. However, contra Bangu (2009), 
Callender (2001), Mainwood (2006), Jones (2006) and others, I contend that no contradiction 
arises by conjoining tenets 1-5. To see this, we must first distinguish between “concrete” phase 
transitions, on the one hand, and “abstract mathematical representations” of them, on the other 
hand.4 To be clear, a “concrete system” would include a physical thermal system of type we find 
in the world or in a lab, while “abstract mathematical” just refers to pieces of math, e.g. a set 
with function defined on it. Also, I take the term “representation” here to be stipulated denotation 
                                                          
1 Butterfield (2011) and Mainwood (2006) use the term “Indispensible,” Jones (2006) uses 
“Ineliminable,” and Batterman (2005, 2011) uses “Essential.” 
2 The paradox of PT presented here in not the exact version presented in Callender (2001, 549). 
Instead, I present the paradox in a manner that is more relevant to my discussion. Several 
authors, such as Mainwood (2006, 223) and Jones (2006, 114-7), have undertaken a similar 
approach.  
3 For precise characterization of various forms of the TDL, see Norton (2011, sections 3 and 4) 
and reference therein. 
4 The distinction between concrete and abstract objects is a well-known. Abstract objects differ 
from concrete ones in the sense that they are non-spatiotemporal and causally inefficacious. 
Paradigm examples include mathematical objects and universals. Cf. Rosen (2001). 
 
 
that is agreed upon by convention.5 For instance, the notation “𝑁” represents “the number of 
particles” (in a given system) in the sense that it denotes the number of particles. Second, notice 
that there are ambiguities with regards to whether the terms “PT” and “partition function” (“𝑍”) 
in tenets 3 and 4 refer to concrete objects, or abstracts mathematical representations of them. As 
concrete objects, PT are concrete phenomena or processes that arise within concrete systems, 
while 𝑍 is some sort of concrete property of such systems. As abstract mathematical 
representations, both PT and Z are just pieces of mathematics that allegedly denote concrete 
objects. To avoid confusion, note that by “abstract PT” I only mean PT in the sense that an 
abstract 𝑍 displays a discontinuity. In the same manner, there is a clear ambiguity concerning the 
physical interpretation, i.e. the concreteness or abstractness, of the TDL. Thus, for example, if 
“PT” and “𝑍” in tenets 3 and 4 refer to abstract mathematical representations, as opposed to 
concrete objects, then there is no paradox: Concrete and finite systems display PT while abstract 
and finite ones do not. Just because abstract mathematical representations of concrete systems 
with finite N do not display PT, does not mean that concrete finite systems do not display PT. 
Alternatively, if “PT” in tenets 3 and 4 do refer to concrete PT, it also does not immediately 
follow that there is a paradox. Rather, what follows is that concrete PT “occur” when abstract 
representations of them display various abstract properties, such as a discontinuity in 𝑍 and an 
appeal to the TDL. One might wonder what explains this particular correlation between 
discontinuities in abstract representational partition function and concrete phase transitions. 
However, prima facie, there is no paradox. 
 The point is that without adding additional tenets that make a claim about the relation 
between, one the one hand, concrete PT occurring in physical systems and, on the other hand, the 
abstract mathematical representation of concrete PT, which arise in scientific accounts of PT, no 
paradox arises.  In the following sub-section I will add such additional tenets in hope to further 
shed light on the central philosophical issue that arises in the context of PT. To end, it is worth 
noting that, if my claim about there being no paradox is sound, then the entire the debate 
revolving around PT, insofar as it is grounded in the paradox of PT as it is stated above, is 
unmotivated and utterly misguided. In particular, notice that the various positions expressed with 
regards to the debate can be delineated by identifying which tenet of the paradox a particular 
proponent denies or embraces. Authors such as Lebowitz (1999, S346), Liu (1999, S92), 
Morrison (2012, 143) and Prigogine (1997, 45) can be read as embracing tenet 3 and identifying 
PT as a kind of non-reductive emergent phenomena. Contrasting attitudes have been voiced by 
Wayne (2009), where Callender (2001) and Menon and Callender (2011) explicitly deny that 
phase transitions are irreducible and emergent phenomena by rejecting tenet 3. Butterfield (2011) 
can be read as both denying and embracing tenet 3, in an effort to reconcile reduction and 
emergence. Norton (2011) can be understood as denying tenet 5. I refer the reader to Mainwood 
(2006, 223-237), who presents an exposition of this type of delineation―i.e. a classification of 
scholarly attitudes to the nature of phase transition grounded in the paradox. For my purposes 
what is important is to identify that the large majority, if not all, of the phase transition debate 
stems from the phase transition paradox. 
2.1 The bona fide Paradox of Phase Transitions and its Generalization 
                                                          
5 Cf. Contessa (2007, 52-55) and references therein. 
 
 
 The key ingredient necessary to engender a bona fide paradox is for a particular kind of 
correspondence relation to hold between abstract representations and concrete systems. To make 
this point clear we must appeal to a further distinction. While I take “representation” to be 
stipulated denotation, by “faithful representation” I mean a representation that allows agents to 
perform sound inferences from the representational vehicle to the target of representation 
(Contessa 2007, 52-55). That is to say, a faithful representation allows agents to make inferences 
about the nature of the target of representation. Thus, it acts as a kind of “guide to ontology”6 
since it accurately describes aspects of the target of representation. In other words, a faithful 
representation is one in which the vehicle and target of representation resemble each other in 
some manner, e.g. they share some of the same, or approximately same, properties and/or 
relations. The classic example here is a city-map, which is a faithful representation of a city 
because it allows us to perform sounds inferences from the vehicle to the target, i.e. from the 
map to the city. This is so because both the vehicle and the target share various properties. For 
instance, if two streets intersect in the map, then they also intersect in the city. That is to say, 
intersecting streets in the map correspond to intersecting streets in the city. Therefore, the map 
acts as a type of ontological guide accurately describing the city, e.g. there really are intersecting 
streets in the city. It is worth noting that my account potentially differs from Contessa (2007), 
who isn’t clear about the ontological aspect of faithful representations. Contessa (2007) 
differentiates from “epistemic representation,” from which valid inferences can be drawn, and 
faithful ones that permit sound inferences. Whether or not such inferences come with ontological 
baggage depends on whether they are about the target itself. On my account, faithful 
representations license sound inferences about the target itself and hence they the fix the 
ontology of the target. 
With this distinction in hand, if we add a tenet that says the abstract representational 
discontinuities representing phase transitions are faithful and hence correspond to concrete 
physical discontinuities we do get a genuine contradiction. This is so because if systems are 
composed of finite many particles, which is the case within the context of the atomistic theory of 
matter conveyed in tenet 2, then it makes no sense to talk of concrete discontinuities. The notion 
of concrete discontinuities presupposes that matter is a continuum so that there can be an actual 
discontinuity. Otherwise, an apparent discontinuity is actually the rapid coming apart of particles 
and not a real discontinuity. Consequently, adding a tenet as the one just described amounts to 
claiming that systems are not composed of finite many particles and so we get: Concrete systems 
are and are not composed of finite many particles 𝑁. 
 In a similar manner, one can engender a kind of paradox by reifying the TDL through an 
appropriate correspondence relation. For instance, one could add the tenet that an appeal to the 
TDL, which could be interpreted as a type of continuum limit faithfully representing an abstract 
system, in fact faithfully represents a concrete system. Thus, we deduce the claim that concrete 
systems are and are not composed of finite many particles 𝑁 (in the sense that the ontology of 
concrete systems is both atomistic and that of a continuum, i.e. not atomistic). 
 The source of the problem of PT seems to be that the mathematical structure that 
scientifically represents concrete PT—a discontinuity in the partition function—is an artifact of 
an idealization (or an approximation)—the TDL—which is essential in the sense that when one 
                                                          
6 Cf. Sklar (2003, 425). 
 
 
“de-idealizes” said idealization, the mathematical structure representing PT no longer exist.7 
Accordingly, I would like to suggest that what is really interesting about PT is the manner by 
they might shed light on the nature of scientific representation and idealization. In particular, 
notice that once concerns regarding representations are incorporated, the paradox of PT can be 
generalized by making use of the concept of an EI: 
1. Concrete systems include a concrete attribute 𝐴. 
2. Concrete systems display a concrete phenomenon 𝑃. 
3. 𝑃 is scientifically-mathematically represented by 𝑃’. 
4. 𝑃’ can only arise by appealing to an idealizing limit 𝐼. 
5. A system in the idealizing limit I includes an attribute 𝐴≈ such that 𝐴 ≠ 𝐴≈. 
6. 𝑃′ faithfully represents 𝑃. 
 
Tenet 1 and 2 imply that concrete systems are 𝐴 and display 𝑃. Tenets 3-5 imply that 𝑃 is 
scientifically represented by 𝑃’, which presupposes 𝐴≈. Tenet 4 encompasses our EI since any 
de-idealization of 𝐼 will render 𝑃’ nonexistent. So far there is no contradiction. But, when one 
adds the correspondence relation described by tenet 6, a bona fide paradox arises: Concrete 
systems are and are not 𝐴 (since they are 𝐴 and they are 𝐴≈and 𝐴 ≠ 𝐴≈). What is important to 
notice is that tenets 1 and 2 are claims about concrete systems, wherein tenet 2 identifies the 
concrete phenomenon to be scientifically accounted for, while tenets 3-5 are claims about 
abstract scientific accounts of concrete systems, and it is tenet 6 that connects the abstract with 
the concrete via faithful representation, thereby engendering a genuine paradox. The question, of 
course, is why would one endorse tenet 6? The answer is that without tenet 6 the entire scientific 
account of the concrete phenomenon in question seems somewhat mysterious to anyone with 
non-instrumental sympathies. In particular, those with realist intuitions will want to unveil the 
mystery with a correspondence relation that tells us that our abstract scientific accounts gets 
something right about the concrete world. But how would one argue for a correspondence 
relation along the lines of 6? It seems to me that, given the “essentialness” aspect of the 
idealizing limit that arises in tenets 3 and 4, the only way to justify tenet 6 is by appeal to an 
indispensability argument.8 In other words, something of the sort: 
1) A scientific account of some concrete phenomena appeals to an idealization(s) and refers 
to idealized abstract objects. 
2) The idealization appealed to is essential to the scientific account in the sense that any de-
idealization renders the scientific account less successful and the idealized abstract object 
nonexistent. 
3) Hence, the idealization appealed to, and the idealized abstract objects made use of, are 
indispensible to the account. 
4) Thus, as scientific realists, we ought to believe that such abstract idealized objects do 
exist and are concrete. Further, the ontological import of such idealizations is true of 
concrete systems, on pain of holding a double standard. 
                                                          
7 For a more precise statement to this effect see Butterfield’s (2011, 1123-1130) and Mainwood’s 
(2006, 216-218) discussion of Lee-Yang Theory and KMS states. 
8 For a survey of the Indispensability Argument of mathematics and a defense see Colyvan 
(2001). 
 
 
Said differently, and in the specific cases of PT, since reference to a discontinuity in 𝑍 is 
indispensible to scientific accounts of PT, and since these discontinuities only arise by appealing 
to EI, we ought to believe in the existence of concrete discontinuities. 
 Thus, in contrast to many of the scholars engaged in the phase transition debate, which 
assume that there is a paradox and then continue to attempt to dissolve it by some manner or 
other, I claim that in order to get a genuine paradox one needs to justify a correspondence 
relation (such as the one appearing in tenet 6) by appealing to an indispensability-type argument. 
Since cogent indispensability-type arguments require serious philosophical work and are very 
much controversial, and since no author engaged in the phase transition debate has undertaken 
such work, it follows that much of the controversy revolving around phase transitions is not well-
motivated. That is to say, claims to the effect (i) that PT are or are not emergent, (ii) that they are 
or are not reducible to Statistical Mechanics (SM), and (iii) that they do or do not refute the 
atomic theory of matter, are grounded in a frail foundation that does not licensed such significant 
conclusions. 
One might worry that, contrary to my claims, a bona fide paradox of PT can arise on the 
epistemological level by conceding to a set of tenets from which it is possible to deduce that SM 
does and does not govern phase transitions. The idea here is to argue that “SM-proper” is not 
licensed to appeal to the TDL and so SM-proper does not govern PT. However, the objection 
continues, it is generally assumed that SM is the fundamental theory that governs PT. Thus, we 
have a paradox and the natural manner by which to dissolve it is to argue that SM-proper does 
indeed have the tools to account for PT (Callender 2001, Menon and Callender 2010), or else to 
claim that PT are emergent. In reply, it is far from clear to me that SM-proper is not licensed to 
appeal to the TDL, and so that it does not govern PT. In fact, there are reasons to think that the 
TDL is ‘part and parcel’ of SM-proper because (a) it is common practice to appeal to the TDL in 
modern approaches to SM, and (b) the TDL is used in SM not only to account for phase 
transitions but to account for, among others, the equivalence of SM ensembles, the extensivity of 
extensive thermodynamic parameters, Bose condensation, etc. (Styer 2004). In addition, (c) all 
the best scientifically accounts of PT, and these include mean field theories, Landau’s approach, 
Yang-Lee theory and Renormalization Group methods, represents PT as discontinuities by 
appealing to the TDL, and (d) the large majority of empirically confirmed predictions of SM, 
within the context of PT and beyond, appeal to the TDL. 
Moreover, even if it was the case the SM-proper is not licensed to appeal to the TDL, no 
contradiction would arise. Rather, it would just be a brute fact that SM-proper does not govern 
phase transitions and “SM-with-the-TDL” does. If then it is claimed that the ontologies of SM-
proper and SM-with-the-TDL are radically different so that indeed there is a paradox, we must 
notice that such a claim amounts to no more than reviving the paradox at the level of ontology, 
and hence my discussion in this section bears negatively on this claim. 
Last, the claim that PT are emergent because SM-proper cannot account for them seems 
to replace one problem—PT are not governed by the fundamental theory—with another 
problem—PT are emergent. How does dubbing PT “emergent” illuminate our understanding of 
them or of their scientific accounts? How is this philosophically insightful? Accordingly, I 
endorse Butterfield’s (2011) description of emergence as novel and robest mathematical 
structure that arises at a particular limit, as opposed to a failure of intertheoretic reduction of 
some sort. It is worthwhile to note that the insistence on the indispensibility of taking such limits 
 
 
for the purpose of emergence understood in this manner has been repeatedly stressed by, e.g., 
Batterman (2005, 2010, 2011). 
3. The Essential Idealization Problem. 
The above discussion points to what I consider to be the central philosophical issues 
arising out of the debate concerning PT. First, the discussion regarding (i) the need for a 
correspondence relation between our abstract scientific-mathematical representations and 
concrete systems, (ii) the appeal to the concept of “faithful representation,” and (iii) the 
identification that the phase transition paradox can be generalized to any scientific account that 
appeals to EI, demonstrates that a solution to the following problem is needed: 
The Essential Idealization Problem (EIP) ― We need an account of how our abstract and 
essentially idealized scientific representations correspond to the concrete systems 
observed in the world and we need a justification for appealing to EI’s, i.e. an explanation 
of why and which EI’s are successful, which does not constitute a de-idealization 
scheme.9 
To this effect Batterman (2005, 2010, 2011) has made progress by explaining that it is not at all 
clear that traditional mapping accounts of scientific and mathematical representation work in 
cases of EI. In particular, this is so because the abstract mathematical structure doing the 
representational work does not “latch on,” and so is not partially isomorphic or homomorphic, to 
any concrete physical structures in the external word. Moreover, insofar as the physical world 
constrains scientific representations, there are reasons to think that consideration of scale size, in 
which the phenomenon of concern occurs, plays an important role in modeling and scientifically 
representing such phenomenon. 
Second, the discussion of indispensability makes it clear that the mystery revolving 
around the EIP is truly mysterious for those with scientific realist sympathies and, in fact, may 
threaten certain conceptions of realism. This follows because, insofar as arguments like the “no 
miracles argument” and “inference to best explanation” are cogent and give us good reason to 
believe the assertions of our best scientific accounts, including those about fundamental laws and 
unobservable entities, then in the case of accounts appealing to EI, these arguments can be used 
via an Indispensability Argument to reduce the realist position to absurdity. What is needed is a 
realist solution to the EIP and thus a realist account of PT. 
In fact, such potential solutions to paradox of PT can extracted from two recent 
contributions to the debate: Butterfield (2011) and Norton (2011). Although it is beyond the 
scope of this paper to treat these contributions thoroughly, I will end by discussing them shortly 
in effort to support my suggestion that, although such solutions pave the road for further work to 
be done, it is questionable whether they are conclusive and exhaustive. 
Butterfield (2011) grants that the TDL is “epistemically indispensable” for the emergence 
of the novel and robust mathematical structure that is used to represent PT, but denies that any 
paradox emerges because the limit is not “physically real.” Using the terminology expressed 
                                                          
9 Mainwood (2006, 214-5) also identifies a similar problem but in a context that is different from 
mine, and his solution (238), endorsed by Butterfield (2011), misses the central issue discussed 
here. 
 
 
here, the discontinuities in 𝑍 play a representational role but not a faithfully representational one. 
The question arises, how come unfaithful representations work so well? To that end, Butterfield 
(2011, Section 3) appeals the distinction, also used by Norton (2011, Section 3), between “limit 
quantities” or “limit properties,” i.e. the limits of properties, and “limit system,” i.e. the system at 
the limit. He continues to argue that the behavior of certain observable properties of concrete 
finite systems, e.g. magnetization of a ferromagnet, smoothly approaches the behavior of the 
corresponding properties of abstract infinite systems. Moreover, it is the large 𝑁 behavior, not 
the infinite 𝑁, which is physically real. 
Norton (2011) suggest that by viewing the TDL as an “approximation”—an inexact 
description of a target system, instead of an “idealization”—a novel system whose properties 
provide inexact descriptions of a target system, we can diffuse any problems that might arise. 
Within the context of our discussion, Norton’s idea is that no paradox can arise if the TDL is an 
approximation since approximations do not refer to novel systems whose ontology might be 
drastically different from the target systems, thereby engendering a paradox once we add an 
appropriate correspondence relation. In a similar manner to Butterfield (2011), his justification 
for appealing to such an approximation is pragmatic: the behavior of the non-analytic 𝑍 
belonging to an infinite system, is approached by an analytic Z corresponding to finite system 
with large 𝑁. 
From my viewpoint, this cannot be the whole story. First, both accounts seem to ignore 
that it is a mathematical structure that arises only in the limiting system that is doing the 
representational work for us. Moreover, the accounts seem to suggest that we must revise our 
definition of PT as occurring when the partition function has a discontinuity, and substitute it 
with something along the lines of “PT occurs when various thermodynamic potentials portray 
sufficiently extreme gradients.” The weakness of this suggestion is that we have substituted a 
precise characterization of PT, with a vague one.  But more problematic is the idea that we 
should be able to construct a finite 𝑁 system that has a, say, Helmholtz free energy with an 
extreme gradient, which does evolve into a discontinuity once the TDL is taken.10 Second, the 
Butterfield-Norton approach outlined above seems incomplete for it does not give us an account 
of why it is that the concrete external world constrains us to model and scientifically represent 
certain phenomena with mathematical structures that only emerge in limiting systems whose 
ontology does not correspond to that of the fundamental theory. For this purpose, talk of 
“mathematical convenience,” “empirical adequacy,” and “approximation” (understood as a 
purely formal procedure) misses what seems to be the truly intriguing features of PT. My 
suggestion is that we can further advance our understanding of PT, and similar phenomena that 
gives rise to the EIP, by attempting to amend accounts like Butterfield’s (2011) and Norton’s 
(2011) with some of the key insights of Batterman (2005, 2011) regarding what mathematical 
techniques one must appeal to in order to properly represent certain kinds of phenomena. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 Mainwood (2006, 232) makes the same point. 
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